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294 Abstract
The paper suggests that Luhmann’s theory of social systems and evolution offers 
a powerful approach for analyzing law and the economy. It considers Yugoslavia 
and some Central European countries before and after 1990. Luhmann’s concept 
of evolution stands in stark contrast to mainstream economic theory. It enables us 
to clarify the concept of transformation. A transformation became necessary be-
cause communism was an evolutionary dead end. According to this view, in post-
communism the primacy of functional differentiation needs to be reestablished 
because it was partially reversed under communist rule. In these circumstances, 
the popular call for “sufficient” public control over the market is asking for the 
impossible. Post-communist law is bound to fall behind the evolution of markets. 
This causes economic problems and retards financial deepening.
Keywords: evolution, function systems, re-stabilization, operation closure, 
 judge-made law
1 INTRODUCTION
When speaking about Central Europe and the Baltic states, most observers agree 
that the post-communist transformation1 has been successful. The reverse is widely 
accepted for Russia and the other CIS countries. On the Balkan Peninsula matters 
are more mixed. Recent developments in Ukraine have reminded us that spelling 
out the ingredients of successful transformation continues to be more than just an 
academic concern. Some economists claim that an adequate theory of transforma-
tion has already been provided. However, their treatises2 suffer from a major de-
fect: they gloss over the obvious fact that in post-communism the political and le-
gal systems were in need of fundamental changes and that this transformation was 
by no means less challenging than “the economic transition”. In addition, they tend 
to play down the intricate interdependencies between these three agendas of trans-
formation. The assertion that economic theory by itself can provide an adequate 
understanding of transformation is tantamount to the preposterous proposition that 
political science and sociology lack substance and may without further ado be re-
placed by economic analysis. The poor results of economists’ attempts to compre-
hend post-communism thus reveal the folly of economic imperialism. Gambetta’s 
quip “We know much and understand little”3 aptly describes the failure.
This problem can be solved only by means of an overarching theory, i.e. a theory 
of society. Presumably, no such theory was available in 1990.4 No doubt, econo-
mists were ill-equipped to fill the gap. As will be argued in this paper, their candi-
date for the job, which was the theory of economic systems and Hayek’s theory of 
social order, was not up to it either. Matters changed in 1997, when Luhmann’s 
magnum opus was published. However, few economists took note of the event. 
1 In the course of this paper it will become clear why we prefer this term over the more popular word transition.
2 See, e.g. Roland (2000), Drahokoupil and Myant (2011).
3 See Gambetta (1988:127). 
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295Unfortunately, all of his key works were written in German. English translations 
became available only with great delay and even as of now some central pieces of 
Luhmann’s titanic work have not yet been translated5. Since his texts are about as 
a readable as Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spi-
rit taken together6 this has greatly hampered diffusion.
The paper starts with a critical review of the traditional approach towards transi-
tion. Subsequently, Luhmannian concepts such as function systems, differentia-
tion of systems, operation closure and evolutionary dead ends are introduced. 
Their impact is revolutionary and changes our whole way of thinking.
2 CONCEPTS OF EVOLUTION
2.1 THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
As this paper argues, the failure to understand post-communism is due to an un-
derdeveloped theory of societal evolution. Throughout the history of economic 
thought, economists have occasionally referred to evolution but this has been little 
more than a biological metaphor and a makeshift device grasped at to avoid em-
barrassment. Usually this happened when mainstream theorists were confronted 
with a question for which they had no good answer. If economists are pressured 
hard to explain the meaning of evolution, they tend to quote Hayek7. Hayek re-
minded them of the legacy of the Scottish enlightenment, of David Hume, Adam 
Ferguson and Lord Kames. According to these writers, evolution is unpredictable 
and uncontrollable. It cannot be planned. It keeps surprising us. It is about the 
unintended consequences of human action. According to Ferguson, it creates in-
stitutions that are the “result of human action but not the execution of human 
design”.8
Clearly, this is only a negative concept of evolution. It tells us what evolution is 
not. It does not even ask the question whether all social change is by necessity 
evolutionary and whether other modes of social change are pursuable as well. If 
all social change occurs through evolution and if these Scotsmen have captured its 
essence, bold political action is undesirable. If one knows so little about outcomes, 
wisdom suggests a conservative and risk-averse approach towards policymaking. 
Unfortunately, this policy-stance is unlikely to win democratic elections. Democ-
racy tends towards the welfare state, which is tantamount to political activism.9 
As far as the post-communist transformation is concerned, the Scottish view, pre-
sumably, suggests gradualism. Wiles’ (1992:392) advice against haste (“… things 
5 Luhmann (1990, 2000) to this date can be only read in German. 
6 This is not an approving statement!
7 Or they refer to Nelson and Winter (1982) who however did not answer the questions posed in this paper. 
They confined themselves to an attempt to apply a particular concept of evolution to a free enterprise eco-
nomy. For a refutation of this concept see Luhmann (2012:337).
8 See oll.libertyfund.org/groups/104 with reference to Ferguson: An Essay on the History of Civil Society. 
London: Cadell 1767.
9 This has been deplored by (neo)liberals who have been calling for a return to limited government. See, e.g. 
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296 done in haste are done badly”) probably captures its essence. Indeed, Hayek him-
self used the word “gradual” in ways that suggest that evolution is more or less 
tantamount to gradual change.10
The experience of Central Europe disproves this view. In little more than a decade 
Central European countries went through changes that had taken centuries else-
where. This was social change on the superfast track. If gradualists had been right 
all of this should have ended up in total disaster, but it did not. This false progno-
sis is not the only defect of the gradualist conception. It also fails to pay due re-
spect to the degree to which the communist economic order depended on the co-
ercive powers of government. When communist power was fading, this indispen-
sable building block was irretrievably lost. The decline of communist power was 
revealed by two economic ills, inflation and foreign indebtedness. The rising tide 
of inflation, whether open or repressed, as well as the mounting foreign debt and 
increasing shortage of foreign exchange, indicated that the regime was no longer 
able to resolve distributional conflicts, and, as a result, lost control over the money 
supply and imports.11 In the late eighties at least one of these two symptoms of 
crisis, if not both, could be found in all communist countries except Czechoslova-
kia12 and China.
Presumably, the post-communist transition would have been a lot easier, if East 
European communists had undertaken decisive steps in the direction of the market 
at a time when they still wielded enough power to carry this project out. By the 
1980s, they had wasted the chances history had offered to them. In retrospect, we 
know that their rule had become fragile and that most communist leaders were 
aware of this. Even if Gorbachev had wanted to implement bold market-oriented 
reforms, he could not have succeeded. The attempt would only have resulted in his 
fall, irrespective of the vast powers the formal organization of government be-
stowed upon him. Historians proved this convincingly.13 Among the European 
communist countries, only Hungary and Yugoslavia undertook market-oriented 
reforms at a time when communist power was still solid. As a result, transition 
without shock may have been conceivable in these countries. In Yugoslavia, this 
opportunity was lost when inflation got out of control and the Yugoslav project 
headed towards bankruptcy, rendering political disintegration along ethnic lines 
unavoidable.14
10 See, e.g. Hayek (1989:30ff).
11 For a general discussion see Madžar (1990:358f). For a more specific view on the Soviet Union see Gajdar 
(2007), for the GDR Schürer (1998), for Bulgaria Christov (2007). 
12 See Turek (1995). For the reasons why Czechoslovakia was different see Možný (2009). Obviously, this 
made post-communist reforms easier.
13 Durman (1998) and Gajdar (2007) offer impressive accounts.
14 The peculiar window of opportunity that Yugoslav socialism offered presumably closed in the 1970s, when 
Tito sided with the conservatives against the liberal wing of the SKJ (League of Communists of Yugoslavia). 
Luhmann’s theory suggests various speculations about the Yugoslav project. Presumably it got on a wrong 
start as early as 1919, when it was decided that the capital of the Kingdom should be Belgrade. If the inten-
tion had been to build a modern state rather than an empire, Zagreb would have been the better choice. One 
may wonder whether Italy would still exist, if Naples or Palermo had been chosen for the capital after Italian 
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297The history of market-oriented reforms undertaken under communist rule casts 
further doubts on the possibility of transition without shock. As a rule, market-
oriented reforms were successful only if they were undertaken at a relatively early 
stage of communist rule and if they liberalized a sector of considerable impor-
tance in which no more than a partial return to pre-communist patterns was needed 
to unleash entrepreneurial spirits and generate a surge of output. The prime candi-
date was agriculture.15 This happened e.g. in China, Hungary and Yugoslavia. The 
Chinese and Hungarian reforms of industrial management were predated by an 
agricultural reform that created prosperity because it offered entrepreneurial 
 opportunities to farmers.16 According to McKinnon (1992) the Chinese path to-
wards market-oriented reforms was in the spirit of Hayek. He suggested that econ-
omists should think about Hayekian approaches for Eastern Europe. However, 
nobody ever managed to meet this challenge. This indicates that the Hayekian 
concept of evolution could not tackle the issue of post-communist transformation.
2.2 A NEW APPROACH
In this dilemma, Luhmann’s concepts come in handy.17 In the spirit of Luhmann, 
communism may be conceptualized as an evolutionary dead end. If, by mistake, 
you are running down a dead end road, turning around early saves time and trou-
ble. The failure to do this in time explains the misfortunes of later attempts at re-
form. The abstract concept behind the metaphor of a dead end is “a normalization 
of the improbable that no longer suffices for further evolution”18. In the course of 
evolution certain operations, which hitherto have appeared far-fetched and un-
likely, become perfectly normal and a matter of everyday experience. However, 
not everything can be normalized. Evolution keeps trying. Most, if not all, at-
tempts fail. A second piece of evidence supporting the view that communism was 
a dead end is the amazing ease of its collapse. Have we ever seen an empire of this 
enormous size vanishing with so little ado? To be sure, the ideological conviction 
which had built the empire had long been fading, but such problems usually can 
be solved and the fading ideas substituted for by fresh ones. The medieval and 
early modern nobility of Western Europe managed to do this. It overhauled its 
in terms. The socialist emphasis on redistribution was bound to alienate the wealthier regions of the country. 
At a deeper level of analysis it is worth pointing out, that, with few exceptions, “nations” came into existence 
as a side-effect of transition towards the primarily functionally differentiated society, i.e. the very opposite of 
socialism. See Luhmann (2013:283).
15 For more on this see Gajdar (2012:468). His ultimate source of inspiration was an unpublished paper of 
Berliner quoted in Sachs and Woo (1994:121). Berliner wrote: “The Chinese transformation began with mil-
lions of peasants and others virtually beating at the gates of government to dismantle the restraints of the past 
and to let them work and thrive. When the gates were let down, they rushed in, and produced that remarkable 
surge of output. Soviet farmers, however, were not beating …”
16 See Berend (1990:93f). In 1958, Hungarian communists started to revise their concept of socialist agricul-
ture and created opportunities for private entrepreneurship. As a result, agriculture thrived. This was widely 
noticed. GDR-economists called it a miracle. The Hungarian party leadership took care to hide the reasons for 
this outcome. It did not want to be castigated for “Titoism”. Polish agriculture was not fully socialized either. 
Unlike the aforementioned countries, this was not a prelude to market socialism, which was tried only in the 
1980s and turned into an outright disaster for the regime. See Hardy (2009:23-26). For this reason Gajdar 
 classifies Poland and the Soviet Union as prime examples of the dead end-proposition. 
17 A complete review of Luhmann’s theory and its applications is beyond the scope of this paper. Moeller 
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298 self-image and world-outlook several times without jeopardizing its supremacy in 
society.
Moreover, Luhmann proposes that the term evolution should be used only if vari-
ation and selection can be distinguished and have become random events for each 
other. This can occur only in complex systems. Such systems can generate large 
numbers of variations, most of which are discarded and forgotten without leaving 
a trace.19 At some moment, unexpectedly, a variation is selected. This may result 
in great changes. As an example, think of the innumerable instances of dissent and 
opposition that occurred throughout the history of communist rule and were 
quickly crushed by the regime.20 In 1989, all of a sudden, dissent caused momen-
tous and unpredicted consequences. This conceptualization implies that evolution 
is not tantamount to a slow-moving process. The opposite may be true. Long times 
of stagnation may be followed by a catastrophic avalanche of change, by an ac-
cumulation of effects and after-effects. In Luhmann’s words (2012:253): “Evolu-
tion is, as it were, a theory of waiting for useful chances.”
For further analysis, we need to take a closer look at the system that is subject to 
evolution. At this point, the term post-communist transformation turns out to be 
superior to the term transition, because it captures the idea that post-communism 
is about a change of the primary form characterizing society, its primary mode of 
internal differentiation. Throughout the world, the nineteenth century witnessed 
the rise of functional differentiation and its establishment as the primary form of 
world society. This means that the economy, law, politics and some other areas 
became “operationally closed”, autonomous function systems, each of which is 
specialized in fulfilling a particular function for society and employs its own self-
generated structures and “memory” for this purpose. The idea of self-generated 
structures distinguishes this concept from older teachings about the division of 
labor. The prevalence of this form on a world scale, however, does not imply that 
all of its function systems operate properly in all territories of the world society. 
They do not! In most countries of the world, law works badly. Its autonomy is 
jeopardized and courts are subject to political interference if a case is considered 
politically important. The resulting underdevelopment of the legal system causes 
severe problems for both business and politics. By way of illustration, consider 
the division of powers and the institution of a democratically elected legislative 
assembly. This idea loses much of its appeal if the laws given by the legislature 
have little or no effect. This is the likely outcome if the administration of justice is 
less than “tolerable”21.
19 This definition implies that the technical progress generated by the research and development departments 
of companies is not evolution in the Luhmann sense. In contrast, the basic research done at universities (such 
as the research that resulted in this paper) is evolutionary. Proof: most of the research papers written by pro-
fessors rapidly fade into oblivion and do not even get a single quote. Like biological evolution, social evolu-
tion tends to produce tremendous abundance.
20 Havel’s (2012) essay conveys the feeling of hopelessness that the apparent invincibility of the regime caused 
among dissenters. 
21 In the sense of Adam Smith, who considered “tolerable administration of justice” as a prerequisite for increas-
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299The mutual relations between the three function systems for the economy, law and 
politics have often been described as harmony and support. However, in reality 
they frequently disturb and obstruct each other. As an example of sabotage, con-
sider a political move towards the overregulation of important industries. This 
weakens their economic performance and backfires on politics because public rev-
enue declines. In addition, corruption spreads because it enables businessmen to 
bypass burdensome regulations. In emerging and developing countries, this may 
result in a sort of vicious circle22. Presumably, this poses less of a danger in wealthy 
countries. They wouldn’t be wealthy if their function systems hadn’t achieved high 
levels of performance. If performance declines after destructive interventions, this 
is strongly felt in many walks of life. Important players may then change their mind 
and seek to correct the error. In post-communism, persistent mutual obstruction is 
a more likely outcome because function systems have not yet reached high stand-
ards of performance and the population has not got used to them.
Communist ideology, in essence, rejected the primacy of functional differentia-
tion.23 This held in particular for the economy, law and politics. After coming to 
power, communists did their utmost to reverse it, striving for dedifferentiation. In 
the confines of the territory they controlled, they largely succeeded. In the rest of 
the world, however, the primacy of functional differentiation has been strength-
ened. Rejecting the form of functional differentiation did not enable communists to 
create a formless society. There is no such thing. Moreover, complex societies need 
to make their primary form somehow observable for themselves, even though such 
self-descriptions are of necessity no more than crude simplifications.24 Availability 
of a plausible self-description is a prerequisite for a steady and reliable reproduc-
tion of the form. The primary form of the society created by communists was hier-
archical differentiation. The doctrine that made this observable inside the system 
was Lenin’s teachings about the leading role of the Communist Party.25 Post-com-
munist transformation, similarly, was about a change of form, this time from hier-
archical to functional differentiation. This is why transformation is an apt term.
This change of form implies an evolution of evolution, i.e. a change of the style of 
evolution. Under the primacy of hierarchical differentiation, variations had a 
chance to be selected if they appeared to be helpful for the stabilization of the hier-
archy. This sort of stability was a primary criterion for selection. Applying it could 
be difficult and mistakes did happen, most notably in the stormy years between 
22 In Greece, for example, reciprocal obstruction of function systems became mutually reinforcing. The decline 
of manufacturing and agriculture resulted in political pressure to create even more public sector jobs.
23 Concerning the law this was implied by the subordination doctrine which viewed the law as “concentrated 
politics”. See Marković and Vuković (1978:550). The source illustrates that this doctrine was upheld even 
in the most liberal of all communist regimes. When Uzelac (2012) expounds the “overarching principle of 
instrumentalism” in socialist law, he points to an aspect of dedifferentiation. As far as the economy is con-
cerned, the doctrine of planning found in innumerable textbooks of the political economy of socialism simi-
larly implied dedifferentiation. 
24 See Luhmann (1995:298f) Functional differentiation was first observed as (enhanced) division of labor. This 
description became available in the 18th century.
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300 1953 and 1957. Under the primacy of functional differentiation, every function 
system selects variations according to its own criteria and without regard to the 
stability of other systems. Moreover: “functional systems switch their mode of se-
lection to essentially unstable criteria” (Luhmann, 2012:297). The functionally dif-
ferentiated society does not have a central authority applying and enforcing a selec-
tion criterion that makes overall stability likely. Politicians may be under the illu-
sion that this is up to them but they are wrong. If the selections performed by some 
function system oversupply other function systems with disturbances, corrections 
can be made only ex post. “Overall, society switches its stabilization efforts to re-
active procedures. Society has become too complex and too opaque to set stability 
as an attainable goal” (ibid, 2012:295). An example of a reactive procedure was 
given above. If politics obstructs important industries, this will backfire on politics. 
After a while, politics will start to recognize and try to correct its mistake. This 
means that evolution routinely consists of three different components. It is not just 
about variation and selection, but also about re-stabilization, because selections, be 
they positive or negative (acceptance and rejection of a variation), inadvertently 
cause stability problems that will need to be treated subsequently.
2.3  SYSTEM DIFFERENTIATION IN POST-COMMUNISM: THE LAW AND POLITICS
In section 1, the Russian and the Ukrainian transformation were assessed as un-
successful and incomplete. Section 2.2 revealed the theoretical foundations of 
this proposition. In Russia and the other CIS-countries, the “outdifferentiation” of 
function systems has remained incomplete. At least for some of the major function 
systems “operation closure” has not yet occurred. This can be shown for numer-
ous function systems26, but this paper is primarily concerned about the economy, 
law and politics. Corruption is a case in point. Of course, corruption cannot be 
extinguished. However, there is a difference between countries in which corrup-
tion is pervasive and well-entrenched, and others, where it is more of an occa-
sional affair and largely limited to a few interfaces between different function 
systems that tend to be particularly corruption-prone like public procurement and 
socialized medicine. If corruption is pervasive, the distinction between the economy 
and politics is blurred, while occasional corruption honors it in the breach. Perva-
sive corruption means that politics and public administration generate and sell 
business opportunities. Businessmen are turned into subtenants of politics and are 
kept in a precarious position because the rental fee may change suddenly. In 
 contrast to Eastern Europe, in Central Europe corruption is not pervasive.
System differentiation between the law and politics requires that politics is in ac-
tual fact constrained by the constitution of the country.27 If this constraint is bind-
26 The peculiar role of the Orthodox Church in contemporary Russia is noteworthy in this context and so is the 
lack of academic freedom. It indicates that operation closure has remained incomplete not only in the func-
tion systems discussed in this paper, but in others as well.
27 See Luhmann (2004:410) for his concept of constitution. In the functionally differentiated society the con-
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301ing, politicians take a serious political risk whenever they violate clear-cut consti-
tutional provisions. Countries with incomplete differentiation usually have some 
sort of constitution as well, but its primary role is “to protect hierarchy’s need for 
latency.”28 Generally speaking, a merely symbolic role of the constitution is in-
compatible with the full differentiation of function systems. Full functional dif-
ferentiation between the law and politics implies that the law embarks on its own 
independent intra-societal evolution. What matters is that this evolution actually 
occurs, whether jurisprudence and legal theory have taken notice or not. Jurispru-
dence may need time to discover this evolution. To be sure, in England the discov-
ery was made as early as the 17th century. It happened in England, because in 
Common Law evolutionary features are easier discernible.29 On the Continent, the 
historic school recognized evolution, but its impact remained limited. As a result, 
Eugen Ehrlich, professor legum (of laws) at Czernowitz (Bukovina)30, managed to 
make a stir, when he proposed in 1913: “We shall have to get used to the thought 
… that the intent of the author of a statute is a matter of absolute indifference so 
far as its effects are concerned. Once in force, it goes its own way”.31 The stir was 
symptomatic of the prevailing spirit, since Ehrlich’s dictum was little else than a 
law-specific restatement of the most widely quoted Scottish definition of evolu-
tion: The result of human action but not of human design. The traditional neglect 
of evolutionary concepts in much of Continental legal theory explains, why in 
1990 even the boldest post-communist reformers tended to think about law as a 
product of legislation rather than evolution.32
The distinction between law and politics has deep roots in Europe. The ancient 
idea of a legal right to resist tyrannical rule exemplifies this tradition.33 Soviet rul-
ers were confronted with it when they extended their empire towards the Balkan 
Peninsula and Central Europe. Historians have managed to trace some of the ef-
fects. They showed that even at the climax of Stalinism Czech courts were not 
always obedient servants of the secret service and communist officials. Seeking 
refuge in the courts sometimes helped citizens if their alleged political offences 
28 See Luhmann (1995:337): “The more starkly a system is hierarchized, the more clearly do forms whose 
latent function is to protect hierarchy’s need for latency stand out.”
29 This was noticed already by Maine (1906:4) who wrote: “… that an Englishman should be better able than 
a foreigner to appreciate the historical fact…” 
30 Nowadays this is Černivci.
31 Ehrlich (1962:375). For a much-quoted American statement of the evolutionary view, see Holmes (1991:1): 
“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent 
moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which 
judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the 
rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through many 
centuries … In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become. We must 
alternately consult history and existing theories of legislation. But the most difficult labor will be to under-
stand the combination of the two into new products at every stage…”
32 Notice, that the evolutionary approach doesn’t negate the role of legislation. It “only” insists that legislation 
cannot determine the development of law. And this is what Ehrlich said.
33 In actual fact, this was primarily a right of the nobility who used it quite actively. Outside Europe, conflicts 
between kings and the nobility were common-place as well, but even if they were couched as matter of right 
the underlying notion of right was not clearly distinct from custom. As Berman (1983) points out, the estab-
lishment and amplification of this distinction constituted the unique advance made in Western Europe during 
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302 were considered minor. This was shown in Czech research about the expropriation 
and resettlement of so-called kulaks (large farmers)34. Notwithstanding these ob-
stacles, communist governments deformed the law radically. All fields of law 
were thoroughly politicized. Law lost much and sometimes all of its autonomy. In 
this (and only this) regard, a number of communist countries, among them the 
GDR and Czechoslovakia, returned to the Dark Ages, since as Berman (1983) 
showed, the “outdifferentiation” of the law started as early as the 11th century35. A 
major difference between Central Europe and the Soviet Union was that a large 
part of the Soviet population failed to notice this return because it had never been 
much in contact with the law. To be sure, after the reforms of Alexander II, Rus-
sian law had started to evolve. However, in the remaining time before the com-
munist take-over, only a small elite group became accustomed to this new devel-
opment. What remained of the elite after the Civil War was largely liquidated 
during the Cultural Revolution (1928-31)36. Proceeding likewise was not feasible 
in Central Europe. The law had put down much deeper roots and a large part of the 
population had become used to it. As a result, communist propaganda found it 
difficult to convince people that a merger of law and politics was a progressive 
move. It was presumably for this reason that in late socialism Central European 
courts acquired more independence than Soviet courts. This can be demonstrated 
from the example of telefonskoe pravo.37
This analysis leads to the conclusion that a widely held view about post-commu-
nist legal reform is mistaken, because it underestimates the scale of the required 
change. After 1989, it was commonly thought that this reform was primarily about 
an effective protection of courts from political interference and about amending 
statute law. In actual fact, what was required was a radical change of the whole 
operating method of the law. There was a need to regain a nearly forgotten culture 
of refined legal argumentation, not to be confounded with political rhetoric. The 
preconditions for this change were much worse than e.g. in Austria or West Ger-
many in 1945. Austrian and German judges and lawyers had not yet forgotten 
what they had learnt before 1933 or 1938, respectively. In Yugoslavia more of this 
culture had been preserved than in many other parts of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, but this was mostly an academic affair. Moreover, even among Yugoslav 
professors there was a vocal minority group that cared little about legal argumen-
tation proper and kept mixing up law and politics. Differences between the newly 
established and the traditional faculties of law tended to be large.38 The old facul-
34 See Petráš and Svoboda (2014:409f).
35 The reader of Berman’s work is likely to be struck by the distinctiveness which legal communication acquired 
– even vis-à-vis theology! The use of Latin was helpful in differentiating legal from everyday communication. 
36 See Fitzpatrick (1999).
37 This Russian word means that the decision of the court is determined by a telephone call. The power of 
 telefonskoe pravo [telephone law] in various communist countries is discussed in Schönfelder (2012:413-417). 
As of today, Russian telefonskoe pravo is alive and well.
38 At times, some of the new faculties turned into a hotbed of dedifferentiating activism. Examples can be 
found e.g. in the Zbornik Radova of the Novi Sad faculty of law. For a textbook summarizing the “progres-
sive” view see Popović (1981). He was a professor of the newly established law faculty of Niš. For a review 
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303ties kept their tradition of scholarship alive, but not much of this rubbed off on 
students, except a few unusually talented ones. These talented students rarely de-
cided to become judges or solicitors and if they did they often changed their pro-
fession after a while. The judiciary was considered an unattractive employer.39
The limited role of legal argumentation in the daily operations of the judiciary is 
revealed by the texts it used and produced. In Czechoslovakia and the GDR, civil 
procedure essentially turned into some type of social work.40 The writings of law-
yers became indistinguishable from those of laymen. Most litigants were self-
represented. In the GDR, legal representation was considered too unimportant to 
be mentioned in the otherwise meticulous protocol. Civil cases usually ended with 
a settlement. If litigants were intransigent and refused attempts at reconciliation, 
the court more often than not imposed a compromise. Judges educated litigants 
and treated them as immature creatures in need of parental guidance. If the judge 
did not impose a compromise but decided the case, he usually wrote a very brief 
opinion. These “socialist” opinions rarely delved into the legal questions raised by 
the case. If a citizen wanted to get legal information and consulted academic text-
books, academic journals or commentaries written by legal scholars etc., he usu-
ally did not feel illuminated either. Much of this literature was shallow and rou-
tinely avoided the in-depth discussion of controversial legal issues. In contrast, in 
Yugoslavia more and better texts were available. Yugoslav civil procedure never 
degenerated into social work. However, the skill of writing elaborate opinions was 
lost as well, and needed to be relearnt after 1990. This was a drawn-out process. 
An analysis41 of Croatian opinions written in the 1990s found that an attempt to 
build a legal argument was undertaken only in 30 per cent of these texts. Usually 
it was discontinued after a few lines. Only 3 per cent cited at least one precedent. 
Citations of legal literature like commentaries, law journals or monographs were 
found even less frequently. Opinions written by appellate courts tended to be even 
less elaborate than opinions written by trial courts. This is disturbing because ap-
pellate courts should play a key role in establishing precedents. Research about 
opinions written by Czech judges leads to somewhat different conclusions. In 
contrast to some of their Croatian colleagues, they were diligent and hard-working 
persons. After 1990, they started to write long opinions that contained a detailed 
description of the facts established in court and the course the procedure had ta-
ken, the judicial advice given to litigants and so on. However, like the Croatian 
opinions, these Czech texts avoided discussing the legal merits of the case.42 In 
either case, it would be wrong to blame judges for a failure that was primarily due 
to the loss of the tradition of legal argumentation.
39 See, e.g. Uzelac (1992:582).
40 See Markovits (1995, 2000) on the GDR. Markovits was primarily interested in the sociology of commu-
nist law. In most communist countries, the available research primarily takes a legal-history and legal-th-
eory approach. According to Kühn (2005:XVI) Markovits’ findings hold for Czechoslovakia as well. Mańko 
(2013b) similarly emphasizes the limited role of legal argumentation even in countries like Poland that man-
aged to preserve more of their legal tradition. 
41 See Harašić (2006).
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304 Luhmann (2004:330) argues that the social functions of legal reasoning have not 
been fully elaborated by the available theories of legal argumentation. Legal rea-
son is “artificial reason”43. Its key contribution is “the creation of sufficient 
redundancy”.44 “Reasons are symbols for redundancy” (ibid:331) The long-run 
result of reasoning is the provision of “a web of points of view … we call it legal 
doctrine … The outcome of all these checks, which also serve to show what can 
go wrong, is a tradition of principles, rules, and doctrines but also of rejected al-
ternative instructions which form the reservoir from which legislation and above 
all judicial lawmaking take their materials” (ibid:326-327). A developed culture of 
legal reasoning provides guidance to judicial decision-making, but it doesn’t de-
termine its results. It leaves room for controversy by limiting controversy. It serves 
as a “shield … against a constant and ultimately limitless political ‘questioning’, 
that is, as a rule for limitation for reasoning in its quest for reasons” (ibid:342). 
This is the ultimate defense against political pressures on judicial decision-mak-
ing. If this defense has been put in place, “all efforts to steer courts onto a politi-
cally desirable course must confront the internal workings of courts. Most of the 
time they founder on the internal culture, the mode of argument operating within 
the legal system” (ibid:365). This is the reason why communists wanted to aban-
don tradition and rebuild the legal system from scratch. This rendered law de-
fenseless against political interference. The missing defense cannot be adequately 
substituted for by formal fire-walls, such as the institutional independence of the 
judiciary that Italian-style self-administration offers.45 The autonomy of the law 
should not be confused with institutional independence. Neither is it institutional 
independence plus something else. The judiciary is a large organization and large 
organizations are always infiltrated by politics. Italian-style institutional inde-
pendence cannot prevent it. What really matters is what happens afterwards. Ital-
ian-style judicial independence makes it difficult to prevent long-term damage 
from infiltration. In contrast, in Germany, the (state or federal) minister of justice 
appoints judges. These decisions are indisputably political, but for this very rea-
son the minister takes care to avoid the shameless politicization of judicial ap-
pointments that the political factions represented in the Italian High Judicial 
Council pursue. In German appointment processes, considerable emphasis is 
placed on provable professional expertise and competence. As a result, levels of 
professional competence tend to be high.
I have emphasized the role of routine and redundancy in legal reasoning and the 
discipline that it provides. The belief that this discipline can be replaced by or-
ganizational arrangements amounts to a confusion of two different types of social 
43 This is the famous wording of Chief Justice Coke who “rejected the authority that James I claimed to have 
over his own reasoning. Reasoning, in Coke’s view, had to be ‘artificial reason’, that is, to be professionally 
induced through experience and competence.” (Luhmann 2004:311).
44 Luhmann (2004:319), who continues in a footnote: “Or, to use the words coming from legal practice, ‘to 
keepe as neare as may be to the Certainty of the Law and to the Consonance of it to it Selfe’, namely those 
of Sir Matthew Hale in an objection to Hobbes in the seventeenth century.” Redundancy means routine, i.e. 
repetitive communication. Redundancy renders it possible to recognize the Self of the Law. 




































































40 (3) 293-318 (2016)
305system. It fails to recognize the difference between the function (sub)systems of 
modern society and organizations.46 To be sure, all function systems depend on 
organization – the law cannot operate without courts, the economy cannot operate 
without firms – but what they need is a great multitude of different organizations. 
Some play the role of centers while others are located in the periphery of their 
respective function system. In the case of the economy, banks and central banks 
form the center while real sector firms and other entities populate the periphery. In 
the case of the law, the courts form the center, while law firms, parliament and so 
on are in the periphery. This positioning of parliament demonstrates the radical 
divergence of Luhmann’s approach from more traditional political theory.
2.4  DIVERGING VELOCITIES AND THE LOSS OF PUBLIC CONTROL  
OVER THE MARKET
In post-communism, the economic system evolved much faster than the legal sys-
tem. When profit-maximizing behavior was no longer ostracized, the economy 
spurted. After the removal of administrative obstacles, it quickly reintegrated into 
the world economy, provided that some basic requisites were met such as a rea-
sonably developed transportation network and a manufacturing sector enabling 
the country to generate export revenues outside the former socialist camp. This 
reintegration was tantamount to emancipation from political tutelage and sharply 
reduced political control over the economy. The speed at which this materialized 
stood in striking contrast to the vacillations of the law.47 In Central Europe, the 
lagging of the law was not as obvious at first, because the enactment of new stat-
utes seemed to proceed at a fast pace. Economists tend to be unaware of the dif-
ference between law and legislation and to overrate statute law. In Yugoslavia, the 
erroneous belief that social reality can be determined by statute production used 
to be referred to as zakonomanija (law mania) and dekretomanija (ordinance 
mania).48 Economists (and socialists) are prone to these manias. They were over-
impressed by the legislative activity of Central European parliaments. It took 
them years to detect “implementation problems”. When the problems could no 
longer be overlooked, economists once more blamed them on insufficient statute-
production. Zakonomanija has long become a sort of reflex action.
This fallacy can be detected in the writings of American economists as well, and 
the Nobel prize winner Joseph Stiglitz has distinguished himself as its most prom-
inent proponent.49 The wording differs. Instead of statute-production or delegated 
46 This distinction is elaborated in Luhmann (2013) and is one of his major contributions.
47 Luhmann suggests a theoretical approach to measuring velocity. It employs the concept of eigenvalue, which 
in system theory means relatively stable parts of system structures. Stability is needed to forecast system oper-
ations. System-theory proposes that a system is unlikely to survive for long if it does not manage to create 
eigenvalues. In the legal system, eigenvalues are crucial for the predictability of judicial decisions. In the eco-
nomic system, the key eigenvalue is the future value of money. In either case, it is intuitive that both social 
support for the law and the acceptance of money will decline if such forecasts tend to be extremely unreliable. 
In most post-communist countries, money was stabilized in the course of the 1990s. In contrast, forecasting 
the outcome of litigation remained very difficult. According to Rychetský (2004:92), in the Czech Republic, 
post-communist administration of justice resembled a “dark jungle”. Its decisions were totally unpredictable. 
48 See Pašić (1981:225).
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306 legislation he writes about “regulation”. This vague term suggests the need for 
public control over the market. In Stiglitz’s writings, it presumably means both the 
common law method of public control and direct public regulation50. He has not 
addressed the issue of whether direct public regulation should be subject to judi-
cial review. Presumably, he meant some mixture of both methods and ignored the 
concern that judicial review was unlikely to constrain government interference in 
post-communism. Because of Stiglitz’ authoritative intervention, the fallacy was 
“reconfirmed” as a putative truth and once more committed to the collective mem-
ory of the profession.
Among legal scholars, the fallacy is less popular. The author of this paper remem-
bers how discussions with legal scholars went in 1991 and 1992. They argued that, 
in the short run, only liberalizing measures would produce an effect. The other 
provisions would become effective much later, because courts would need at least 
ten years to clarify their meaning. Only after this clarification could citizens be 
expected to abide by the law. By way of illustration, the decriminalization of pri-
vate enterprise and “speculation”, a liberalizing measure, had an immediate effect, 
and it was of considerable importance that it occurred in Czechoslovakia in 1990 
while in most CIS-countries this came much later. In contrast, the provisions of 
company law that protect small stock-holders against block-holders and managers 
remained irrelevant for at least a decade. Economists often ignored this insight 
because it didn’t fit in with their mindset. Legal scholars weren’t quite right, ei-
ther. They were too optimistic about the length of the lags. They should have said 
30 years instead of ten, or maybe 50. They assumed that clarifying the meaning of 
the law would take post-communist courts no longer than West German courts. 
This was utterly unrealistic. The assessment of legal scholars was based on experi-
ence, not on theory.
After 1989, a rebirth of legal reasoning was needed. This was the key to the op-
erative closure of the function system of the law, since “in the normal process of 
decision-making, the system … observes itself – as an accumulation of legal texts 
that refer to each other … The crucial point is that the system can ‘recall’ internal 
contexts from the past and through that reduce the scope of possible operations in 
the present. Finding the relevant texts … requires professional competence and 
thus it represents a crucial (and frequently overlooked) instance of legal skill” 
Luhmann (2004:305-306). Only after this skill is regained will solutions for doc-
trinal controversies be sought and found inside the function system of the law. 
When communist judges considered a case, they usually did not consult a variety 
of relevant legal texts51 and even if they did, they usually had no intention of sub-
jecting them to critical review, which could have resulted in an innovative, but 
system-compatible solution of the case at hand. In some Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries as in the GDR, judges received detailed instructions concerning 
50 For the distinction see Posner (2011:487).
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307how they were to construe the law. The instructors who performed this task were 
selected and appointed by the department for law and state that worked for the 
party leadership. Instructors used mimeographed texts, which, however, were ei-
ther not handed out to judges or had to be returned. During their lectures, judges 
took notes. Guidelines changed frequently and their rationale was, as a rule, po-
litical, not legal. Critical discussion of these materials was not encouraged. If a 
judge had his own opinion about some question of law, he was required to seek 
prior authorization before he could decide a case accordingly. In 1989/90 all of 
this came to an end. All of a sudden, judges had to take decisions independently 
and on their own responsibility. Moreover, most post-communist countries wit-
nessed a great shortage of legal texts written in the judge’s mother tongue that 
could claim relevance in the new situation. As the Luhmann-quote indicates, this 
was a serious dilemma. The normal mode of system operations was blocked. Even 
in the Czech Republic which had a more lucrative market for legal texts than most 
other post-communist countries52, it took more than a decade for a substantial 
body of relevant texts to be printed or made available electronically.
If post-communist legislation revitalized pre-communist legacies or copied for-
eign models judges could, as a matter of principle, consult pre-communist and 
foreign literature. In Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Yugoslavia, the pre-commu-
nist literature had been removed from the shelves of most libraries and much of it 
destroyed. Foreign literature was accessible only to the few who had learnt foreign 
languages well enough to read it. In Croatia, the old Opći građanski zakonik [Gen-
eral Civil Code] (OGZ, Austrian ABGB) was considered a second-string source of 
law after 1945. The judge was required to consult it if he was confronted with a 
legal question for which the new socialist law held no answer. In doing this, he 
was supposed to read the OGZ through socialist lenses. Austrian commentaries of 
the OGZ were not helpful for this task, and, consequently, they were rarely used 
by judges and lawyers. Moreover, knowledge of German has been much in de-
cline among judges and lawyers. After 1990, change was slow. Likewise, in the 
Czech Republic the pre-communist heritage became widely used only after a 
monumental (5000 pages!) Czech commentary of the OGZ was reprinted. It had 
been written in the 1930s by two of the most prominent legal scholars of the coun-
try53. Following this example would not have been very helpful in Croatia because 
Croatian pre-communist discussions of civil law were less profound than the 
Czech.
Thus, in 1990 law started nearly from scratch and it is in its very nature that this 
was a slow beginning. The former British premier Gordon Brown put it like this: 
“In establishing the rule of law, the first five centuries are always the hardest.”54 As 
a result, scholars who believed that markets must be subject to public control ei-
52 Except Poland, of course. The Czech market was lucrative, because the population was comparatively afflu-
ent. Moreover, Czech texts continue to be used in Slovakia.
53 This is Rouček and Sedláček (1998).
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308 ther had to abandon the request that this control should be under the law, or con-
sider post-communism a fatality that should not have happened. Actually, few 
were ready to face the challenge. Instead they complained. Stiglitz was the loudest 
complainant and was praised for the eloquence of his lament.55 However, by 2005 
one could have noticed that in Central Europe matters were not at all as bad as the 
academic tales of woe suggested. To be sure, the economy often had to struggle 
along without an adequate performance of the law.56 This caused numerous prob-
lems and defects. However, most of the time, temporary expedients were found. 
No doubt, conditions were far from ideal, but liberalization nevertheless had a 
positive impact. Central Europe has fared better than CIS countries, which liberal-
ized less and later.
The proposition that the law should have the lead and “regulate” the economy and 
other walks of life universalizes the course which history took in Europe (except 
in the Ottoman and the Russian empire), but nowhere else, neither in China nor in 
India, nor in Japan. In Europe, law acquired great significance as early as the 12th 
century. The “outdifferentiation” of the law was thus ahead of the “outdifferentia-
tion” of the political system which gained momentum only in the 16th century. 
Canonical law was a key factor in these early advances. The early “outdifferentia-
tion” of law strengthened, and was made possible by, a very pronounced stratifica-
tion of society. As a result of this early evolution of the law, the privileges of the 
nobility were fully juridified in early modern times. This juridification was sup-
ported by theories that emphasized the natural inequality of the estates. Such theo-
ries were accepted in the 16th century, but in the 20th this mindset had long lost its 
appeal. Presumably, its restoration was inconceivable under communist rule. To 
be sure, in common parlance the privileges of communist officials were compared 
with the former nobility, and officials were referred to as a new nobility, but this 
did not restore the idea of natural inequality, although an attempt at revival was 
undertaken57. The failure to juridify the hierarchy meant that the upper class es-
sentially remained outside the law. This division of society was a serious obstacle 
to the growth of the law and the expansion of its sphere of influence. Yugoslav 
history holds lessons about the limits of law under communist rule. Presumably, 
socialist Yugoslavia never came closer to the operational closure of the law than 
during the Croatian Spring (1969-72). Moreover, there was more economic and 
political liberty than at any other time during the Tito era. This resulted in civil 
55 For a critical review of various contributions to this debate see Schönfelder (2012).
56 For the concept of performance see Luhmann (2013:96). It means the services the law provides to other 
function systems.
57 For a review of Stalin’s efforts see Fitzpatrick (1999:82). After the conquest of Belgrade, Tito did not waste 
time either and moved into the king’s premises. Even though he probably never doubted that this was appro-
priate housing, he found it difficult to explain this view to the intellectuals of the country. According to Pirje-
vec (2013a:297, “Nažalost, naši su ljudi uglavnom seljaci, a ti znaš…”) he argued that he was ruling a nation 
of peasants who were much impressed by pomp and rank and wouldn’t respect a ruler who dispensed with it. 
However, this was at best a temporary excuse. According to the party-platform, peasants were to be reformed 
and assimilated to the condition of workers. This observation as well as the ultimate failure of Stalin`s attempts 
to lay the ground-work for a juridification of privilege, support the proposition that under communist rule the 
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309unrest which was thought of as a threat to the Yugoslav federation and communist 
rule and provoked a harsh backlash.58
2.5  FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND FREE USE OF INDIVIDUALLY  
ATTRIBUTED PROPERTY AS STRUCTURAL COUPLINGS BETWEEN  
THE LAW AND THE ECONOMY
Above it was argued that in post-communism reforms could not be sequenced in 
the way that the public-control view suggests. In this section it will be shown that 
even if this problem had been solved somehow, the appearance of suitable, mar-
ket-friendly controls would have been unlikely. Regulations need to be created by 
somebody. Who should be their creator? Presumably, the political system is the 
only available candidate. The legal system is too immature and too slow to make 
significant contributions in time. However, may we hope that the political system 
will perform reasonably well? Not really, if Luhmann is right. Its capacity is lim-
ited and the likely standards of achievement and performance are low. As far as 
the economic system is concerned, low standards imply backwardness and pov-
erty; in the legal system they stand for the short reach and powerlessness of the 
law. If one wants more, the operational closure of function systems cannot be 
avoided. This means that function systems are released into autonomy and launch 
their own system-specific evolution. One may object that this may generate cla-
shes between function systems. Indeed, such clashes cannot be ruled out. If the 
economic system embarks on a journey of its own making, nobody can guarantee 
that the results are bearable from the viewpoint of the law. The autonomous evolu-
tion of the function system of the law causes similar concerns. If left to itself, the 
law may evolve in ways that are incompatible with economic growth. This would 
force entrepreneurs to avoid the sphere of the law and conduct their affairs in law-
less ways. In contrast to 19th century concepts of evolution, Luhmann’s theory 
does not believe in natural selection and survival of the fittest. It rather asks how 
a certain minimum degree of adjustment can be maintained. It considers malad-
justment as a likely outcome of evolution. The real question is then how readjust-
ments can be initiated.
The economic analysis of law has often taken a more optimistic view. Posner 
(2011:714) claims that “judge-made rules tend to be efficiency-promoting while 
those made by legislatures, other than those rules that codify common law princi-
ples tend to be efficiency-reducing.” According to him, adjustment problems be-
tween the law and the economy will disappear in the course of time, if the legisla-
ture doesn’t interfere. An optimal fit will be reached because a hitherto unknown 
sort of invisible hand guides judicial decision-making. This is definitely not the 
invisible hand referred to by Adam Smith. In Posner’s view, the only problem with 
judicial law-making is the slow speed at which common law rules change. “Judge-
made law … will not do when new law has to be made in a hurry, or when a big 
58 In retrospect, it seems clear that Tito saved the federation by means which rendered it non-viable in the long 
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310 change in law is desired.” German experience with judge-made law does not seem 
to confirm this optimistic stance. Important parts of German labor law are judge-
made. It is efficiency-reducing rather than efficiency-promoting although it is not 
as bad as the French legislature-made labor law.59 Before we are ready to trust the 
new invisible hand invoked by Posner, its nature and working should be explained 
in some detail. The economic analysis of law has tried to meet this challenge, but 
has failed to come up with a convincing story. All of its attempts seem to have in 
common, that the outcome crucially depends on the intellectual abilities of judges. 
They assume that the judge’s mind can somehow grasp economic rationality and 
decide accordingly. As far as simple controversies are concerned, this is perhaps 
not utterly unrealistic. Nevertheless, according to Luhmann, it is unwise to rely on 
this mechanism because it is unlikely to ensure a sufficient adjustment of the law 
to the needs of the economic system.
In Central Europe, we have a particular type of empirical evidence suggesting that 
we should not trust Posner’s invisible hand. This is the teaching effectiveness of 
economics courses taught in law school. In Germany as well as in the former Hab-
sburg Empire and its successor states, students of law have long been required to 
take some economics courses. In Germany, most law schools abolished this re-
quirement in the 1960s. Ever since, nearly all German law students have refused to 
study economics. In Austria, Croatia and some other countries the old requirement 
is still in force. As a result Austrian and Croatian judges are much better educated 
about economics than German judges, and one may hypothesize that this enlight-
ens them about the economic consequences of judge-made rules and enables them 
to take more efficiency-promoting decisions than are commonly found in Ger-
many. Unfortunately, there exists, to my best knowledge, no evidence supporting 
this hypothesis. Being a professor of economics himself, the author of this paper 
would be immensely pleased to learn that the efforts of his Austrian (and Croatian) 
colleagues have not been in vain. Unfortunately, he is still waiting for the good 
news. This observation suggests that Luhmann’s skepticism is warranted.
If this is taken for granted, we need other mechanisms to ensure a certain degree 
of compatibility between the economy and the law. Luhmann refers to these 
mechanisms as structural couplings. According to him, individually attributed 
property, contract and competition are the three crucial couplings, but they can 
carry out their tasks only after most legal controls on contract and property have 
been removed. They can be removed only if there is sufficient competition, be-
cause in the absence of competition the economic and social consequences of 
freedom of contract and free use of property are unbearable. Removal of most 
controls is, of course, not tantamount to removal of all controls. These structural 
couplings require a considerable degree of economic liberty, but not “total” free-
dom. These familiar principles of free enterprise reappear in Luhmann’s theory, 
but the positioning differs from classical liberalism. They reappear as structural 




































































40 (3) 293-318 (2016)
311couplings between two subsystems of society and not, as classical liberalism had 
it, as the very “foundations of law and society per se”60. Freedom of contract, of 
course, does not mean that all contracts will be enforced by courts. Courts may 
and should refuse to enforce certain types of contracts (like contracts for criminal 
purposes or contracts in restraint of trade). Moreover, before a contract can be 
enforced, courts need to form an opinion about the proper “interpretation of the 
contracting parties’ expression of intent based on their presumed interests” (Luh-
mann, 2004:397). Neither does the proposed need for structural couplings imply 
that all industries should be turned over to free enterprise as soon as possible. 
What matters instead is that its realm is large enough, that it prospers and provides 
a good living for droves of lawyers who give legal advice to business people and 
represent them in court. If this condition is met, litigation will in the course of time 
produce a body of judge-made rules that will enable entrepreneurs to forecast 
which contracts are likely to be upheld and enforced by the court. Freedom of 
contract enables businesses to contract around clauses deemed unacceptable by 
judges. To be sure, more often than not the rulings of courts will perplex litigants 
and other observers and their rationale will be difficult to defend from the view-
point of economic rationality, but, as a rule, such failures will be found tolerable 
under freedom of contract and individually attributed property, because they pro-
vide sufficient opportunities for these pitfalls to be avoided by writing different 
contracts. Freedom of contract, thus, is a safety net for the failures of courts. Op-
erational closure of law creates hazards, but the safety net makes them bearable.
Yugoslav civil law illustrates what may happen if the safety net is removed. Free-
dom of contract and free use of property were rejected by Yugoslav communists.61 
Yugoslav law tried to regulate the use of private property down to the smallest 
detail. This petty tutelage kept private business away from the courts. Yugoslavia 
always (except 1949-1951) had a large private sector, which employed a sizable 
part of the labor force and generated a much larger share of GDP than official 
statistics show.62 The judicial caseload statistics (civil cases commenced) reveal 
that its share in the civil caseload remained very small (CBS, 1991). The private 
sector preferred to conduct its business in ways that hindered investigations and 
discovery. Most agreements were oral and not written, which renders it difficult to 
identify breach by failure of performance. Law of contract, property and tort was 
codified only in 1978 or in 1980 and, in spite of the long gestation lag, these 
codifications left many controversial issues open. Before codification these fields 
of law were, according to official Yugoslav doctrine, primarily regulated by judge-
made law. According to Alinčić (1994:148 and 2005:179) this doctrine made the 
socialist rejection of freedom of contract and free use of property somewhat more 
60 Luhmann (2012:112). This marks the contrast to Hayek (1989) who appeals to the approach of classical 
liberalism.
61 For this and the following statements see Alinčić (1994:54f; 2005:83) who points out that throughout much 
of the history of socialist Yugoslavia, the public administration and judiciary tended to be more hostile to 
entrepreneurship and private property than the wording of party documents suggested. For examples see also 
Gams (1998:435f). This changed only in the 1980s and only in parts of the country. 
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312 bearable, but that did not help much.63 Socialist civil law hindered rather than as-
sisted trade. As an example, consider the law of real property. Communists were 
preoccupied with private property. Since in Yugoslavia most real estate always 
remained in private ownership, this preoccupation gave rise to numerous efforts at 
reducing its marketability. Seen from a historical perspective, the communist 
transformation of property law resembled a return to the 18th, if not the 12th cen-
tury.64 Observers were struck by this urge. One of them noted accordingly “that 
Yugoslav law … is in the process of developing new forms of almost feudal com-
plexity. This is not surprising because, after all, the refinements of feudalism rep-
resented different types of control of land, and it is this development of different 
types of control and enjoyment of land which is typical of contemporary Yugoslav 
land law”.65 Medieval land law often restrained the alienation of land. Divided 
ownership and estates in land made transfer difficult even if there was no formal 
limitation. Transferability is decisive for operational closure of the economic sys-
tem. “The history of English land law is a history of efforts to make land more 
easily transferable” (Posner, 2011:95). The unitization of divided ownership meets 
powerful resistance even it clearly creates value. Most tenancy holders oppose 
change and, even if they are ready to cooperate in principle, they have every rea-
son to drive a hard bargain. Overcoming such resistance has taken centuries in 
Western Europe. In post-communism, the road back from the 12th century was 
long and slow. There were no short cuts. In many post-communist countries, as a 
result, much real estate will not become easily transferable for a long time.66
3  CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In post-communism, the evolution of law proceeded at a comparatively slow pace 
and fell behind the evolution of the economy. This difference of speed did not end 
up in the catastrophe predicted by some observers. Nevertheless, it seriously im-
paired the operations of the economic system and in particular of the financial sec-
tor, which depends more on the performance of the law than most other industries.
At this point, our analysis blends in with several strands of economic literature. 
One of them is the literature on sovereign debt. If debt collection is difficult or 
impossible, the debtor resembles the prototypical sovereign debtor67. Non-en-
forceability of contracts with sovereign debtors has long been considered a major 
reason why international capital markets are relatively small and limited com-
pared with the national capital markets of countries which are under the rule of 
law. Another strand of literature has focused on the persistent adverse effects of 
temporary financial crises. A “widening of the agency friction” caused by declin-
63 See also Schönfelder (2012:442ff and 481f).
64 It is the 12th century, if English land law is the yardstick, and the 18th if French land law is referred to. 
65 See Chloros (1970:147) who also notes that this was a reversal of the French revolution. “On the Conti-
nent, as a result of the French Revolution, the absolute right of ownership was restored and thus it became an 
expression of individualism, of the rights of man … On the eve of 1789, land law in France was far removed 
from the law of Justinian. ‘It is the Code civil which has given to property its individualistic character’.”
66 Poland has been an exception to this rule. I owe this information to an anonymous referee.
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313ing collateral value was identified as a key generator of these effects.68 It is well 
known that an underdeveloped law of property and security interest widens this 
friction as well.
A third strand evaluates the efficiency of debt collection69, but fails to appreciate 
the sociological implications of its findings. Luhmann (2004:401) suggests that 
the enforcement of civil judgement is a useful indicator for the “outdifferentia-
tion” of the law. Civil law is about legal obligations that are created outside po-
litical control. A credit contract is an obvious example: the creditor and the debtor 
do not ask politics for permission before they conclude it. Enforcement of such 
claims means that the police, i.e. the use of physical power is at the disposal of the 
creditor, if this is needed to enforce his claim, and that his use of this power is 
limited only by the law and not by political considerations. Communists wanted 
to abolish the enforcement of civil judgements, but realized that this would take 
some time. So they took intermediate steps and changed civil procedure in ways 
that weakened and marginalized enforcement.70 Although these ideological beliefs 
faded in the 1970s the intermediate steps were not reversed. This was a push to-
wards dedifferentiation that survived to the end of the communist regime and be-
yond. Early legal reforms undertaken in post-communism often failed to appreci-
ate the significance of this issue. The result often was a decline of confidence in 
the legal system, which occurred as soon as creditors realized that the hard-won 
judgements were worthless because they could not be enforced. In system-theory 
terms this decline is a destabilization of the legal system. Unfortunately, the judi-
ciary could do rather little to restore confidence because legislation was needed to 
improve enforcement. Enforcement is about the use of powers which are under the 
control of the executive branch of government. Stability problems of the legal 
system are unlikely to bother an up-to-date (as opposed to a 19th century) parlia-
ment71. Legislative initiatives are likely to be successful only if they are supported 
by the ruling party and this party is likely to grant support only if the issue has 
turned into a political problem and, thus, has arrived in the political system. The 
crossing of system boundaries is likely to happen only if the problems of the legal 
system have resulted in serious economic problems like a crisis of the financial 
system and, consequently, of the real economy. Then matters can no longer be 
ignored. The theory presented in this paper suggests that strengthening enforce-
ment is re-stabilization – remember the proposition, that functional differentiation 
transforms evolution into a three-step movement – and a sort of re-stabilization 
that is likely to occur only after a crisis extending far beyond the legal system. 
68 See, e.g. Hall (2010:7).
69 See, e.g. Djankov et al. (2008). 
70 This was an explicit purpose of the reform of Czechoslovak civil procedure undertaken in 1964. See Rubeš 
et al. (1970:189). Similar developments occurred in the GDR and Yugoslavia, but the details differed a lot. 
See Thaetner (2003) and Schönfelder (2012:454-464 and 968f). The ideological background was that com-
munists expected a merger of civil law and morals. After the merger, enforcement usually would be achieved 
by moral pressure. How about individuals who refuse to succumb to this pressure? Presumably, they would 
be removed. See the treatment of “outsiders” reported in Markovits (1995).
71 For a striking example for the failure of the legislator to react to the requests of a judiciary that suffered 
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314 This implication is empirically testable. Schönfelder (2012) conducts the test for 
four countries and finds Luhmann confirmed. Further research could extend this 
to other post-communist countries.
This paper focused on a small subset of formerly communist countries. It may be 
instructive to extend the analysis to countries such as Poland in which the dedif-
ferentiation of the law was not pushed as far.72 System-environment theory sug-
gests that this should make post-communist transformation easier. If this can be 
shown, it would provide an empirical test for the theory.73 If less dedifferentiation 
helped in Poland, why did it help so little in most if not all successor states of 
former Yugoslavia countries? Schönfelder (2012) demonstrates that in Croatia the 
legal system developed more slowly than in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. A 
Luhmannian attempt to explain this difference could point to the conflict between 
nation-building and functional differentiation. In Luhmann’s words: “The idea of 
nation … belongs to the set of short-lived semantics that can exercise a fascination 
for a transitional period without betraying what societal system they refer to. It 
can therefore be assumed that this idea is now on the wane, a phase in which it 
does more harm than good and from a sociological point of view constitutes one 
of those obstacles épistémologiques that for reason of past plausibilities block 
urgently needed insights.”74 The idea of nation proposes a unity above function 
systems. However, no such unity can exist nowadays. Function systems operate 
on a world-wide scale. A far as the economic system and science are concerned, 
this is close to obvious, but it holds for the law and for politics as well. All at-
tempts to build a national economy are futile and counterproductive. A compari-
son between Croatia and Slovakia may be illustrative at this point. In the 1992s, 
the Slovaks got their nation-state and this was an effortless achievement. As soon 
as the Slovaks had it, they found out that it did not solve any real problem. It took 
them little time to realize this and act accordingly. In contrast, the Croatian nation-
state was hard-earned and came at the cost of great sacrifice. Small wonder that 
Croats have tended to overestimate this gain. To test the theory one might study 
Slovenia, which should come out as an intermediate case between Croatia and 
Slovakia.
In this paper, system-environment-theory has been contrasted with the approach 
taken by economists. A juxtaposition of legal theory-approaches may be instruc-
tive as well. Legal theorists coined the notions of ultra-formalism or hyperpositiv-
ism that are meant to capture certain characteristics of late socialist and post-
communist judicial decision-making.75 The theory presented in this paper should 
be seen as a congenial to this view. It makes a stab at deepening the analysis. The 
hyperpositivism-literature emphasizes that in the 1970s and 1980s judicial behav-
72 For a comparison see Kühn (2011:25f).
73 In the 1990s, Jacek Rostowski (oral communication), praised Polish citizens for being amazingly law abid-
ing – amazingly in view of the problems of poverty that plagued the country. Rostowski was an astute obse-
rver. If he was right, this would count in favor of the Luhmannian approach taken in this paper. 
74 Luhmann (2013:289) uses the French expression obstacles épistémologiques himself.
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315iour changed. The bluntly political abjudications of Stalinist courts largely were a 
matter of the past. In the vein of system-environment theory this change can be 
classified as a first step towards a renewed “outdifferentiation” of the law. Adher-
ence to judicial procedure and obedience to the letter of the law rendered judicial 
decision-making distinct from the working style of the executive branch of gov-
ernment and the Communist Party which continued to despise such attitudes.76 In 
post-communism operational closure became feasible. Whatever judges had 
learnt in school, they couldn’t help noticing that all of sudden they had to decide 
cases – and not just arbitrate them, as they often did in the GDR and Czechoslo-
vakia, or double-check or implement decisions taken by the prosecutor or politics. 
And these weren’t the petty and (for the most) easy cases which filled the civil 
dockets of communist courts.77 Post-communist judges couldn’t help noticing that 
“hard cases” cannot actually be decided within the narrow confines of hyperposi-
tivism. System-environment theory proposes that operational closure creates in-
determinacy inside the system. Indeterminacy is a prerequisite for decision-mak-
ing.78 Henceforth, decision-making needs to be guided by a “system memory”, but 
this memory grows only as a by-product of system-operations. In this predica-
ment, judges grasped at straws. They employed hyperpositivism to make excuses. 
In addition, hyperpositivism may have been another obstacle épistémologique, 
but the theory would suggest that in view of the paramount importance of opera-
tional closure this should be a matter of secondary importance. If this proposition 
is right, hyperpositivism should not be regarded as a “third legal tradition” on the 
same footing as Common Law and Roman Law.79
76 In communist Czechoslovakia and the GDR public administration and the Party nearly always preferred 
to take an informal approach neglecting procedural niceties and emphasizing political correctness (“follow-
ing the party line”). See Bernet (1995), Kabele (2004:46) and Schröder (2008:42). In Yugoslavia this held for 
party officials, but not necessarily for public administration. 
77 In Yugoslavia as well as in the GDR and Czechoslovakia a political decision-maker “guided” the court when-
ever a controversy was deemed politically important – except during the Croatian spring. See Pokrovac (1988) 
and Uzelac (2012). The handling of unimportant cases differed from the GDR and Czechoslovakia: they were 
often decided by Yugoslav judges rather than arbitrated. See Schönfelder (2012:472).
78 Luhmann (2000:147) approvingly quotes Shackle’s dictum: “Choice is an exploitation of unknowledge.” 
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